



How big was SU investment in 1960 and 1961?

How much technical advice did they give?

"How could they go on?"

"They couldn't pull out; they had to invest more

They couldn't do it on old basis.

They will not permit defeat or collapse of a Communist state anywhere. (precedent).

A Communist victory must be irreversible; ③

"We go only forward." ②

[How about Mao doctrines: willingness to retreat? Guevara's expectations of US invasion?] ②

[Is Cuba a Communist state?] ②

"Russians no longer trust Cubans to use their material will. That is why they have had to send in such large numbers of technicians; they are now giving orders."

"The Communist mind is more likely to figure out enemy's reaction to a move than we are (consciously?)

"Russia has a potential Algeria on its hands";

"Will it be a Russian Algeria or a US Algeria?"

Biggest demands are made on C+C system not in "worst" situation but in intermediate situations; if it can handle those, it can handle "worst."

Cuba offers SU a chance to use nuclears from sites outside of SU.

(Things, as "worst" used to be defined, it did provide capability relevant to crises in terms of data processing, comm, etc. (not info):

Decision to Execute, prior to arrival of warheads.

Later, plans for post-attack Execution led to capabilities not relevant to crisis.

Spasm War put minimum requirements on: Warning, ^(CF targets) surveillance, Intell, Recon, Comm: pre- and post-attack info (things, requirements not met: desires to preserve authorized command, preserve org. channels, avoid false alarm, withhold from allies, designate nations; "optimize," coordinate attack, avoid interference).

TEAS-TEMPO

Duane Taylor } dynamic programming
Ed Peterson }
Becker (psychol.)

C.P.

Bonini, Simulation of Info & Decision Systems in the Firm
gt from Julian Feldman, Center for Research in
Management Science,
Berkeley 9, Cal.

SOC: Madanis: Paul Genthner (Radner & McKelvey)

Mark Newbold (Sociologist from Harvard)

North, at Stanford

Wood & Friedman: programs for force allocation under
constraints

Administrative Science Quarterly

Julian Feldman: The Org as a Problem-solving
Process, 1 Oct 62

Callan, Thompson, RM 62 TMP-49, 13 July 62
Concept for the Navy Operational Control
Complex of the Future

Jan 3

MacQueen, RM 61 TMP-56 21 July 61
The Concept of Capability

Memo to Mandanis from Edwards, 15 July 62
~~At~~ Amplification of topics

Mandanis, Plan for C+C Research

Kahn: Deterrence & Defense in the late Sixties
and Early Seventies

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1. AVW seminar
2. Call Capt. Harris, USMC
3. Call Don Hall, Savage
4. Notes on Cuba.
5. Comments on Rush-Houlitt
6. C² Ad hoc Comm Proposal
7. Edit RM.
8. Letter to Gandelinsky on Accidents
9. Write Journal. comment on his papers; send E. papers.
10. Guggenheim Foundation
11. Read Becker paper, write.
Read Lane paper & thesis, write.